The Key Amygdala-Hippocampal Dialogue for Adaptive Fear Memory by Desmedt, Aline
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors
Our authors are among the
most cited scientists
Downloads
We are IntechOpen,
the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books
Built by scientists, for scientists
12.2%
122,000 135M
TOP 1%154
4,800
Chapter 13
The Key Amygdala-Hippocampal Dialogue for
Adaptive Fear Memory
Aline Desmedt
Additional information is available at the end of the chapter
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/67582
Abstract
For centuries, philosophical and clinical studies have emphasized a fundamental dichot-
omy between emotion and cognition, for instance between implicit/emotional memory 
and explicit/representative memory. However, in the last few decades, cognitive neuro-
science has highlighted data indicating that emotion and cognition are in fact in close 
interaction and that reciprocal amygdalar-hippocampal influences underlie their mutual 
regulation. While supporting this view, the present chapter discusses experimental data 
indicating that the hippocampal and amygdalar systems not only regulate each other 
and their functional outcomes but also qualify specific emotional memory representa-
tions through specific activations and interactions. Specifically, we review consistent data 
unveiling a direct contribution of both the amygdala and septo-hippocampal system to 
the identification of the predictor of a threat in different situations of fear conditioning. 
Our suggestion is that these two brain systems and their interplay determine the selection 
of relevant emotional stimuli, thereby contributing to the adaptive value of emotional 
memory. Hence, beyond the mutual quantitative regulation of these two brain systems 
described so far, we propose that different configurations of the hippocampal-amygdalar 
network qualitatively impact the formation of memory representations, thereby produc-
ing either adaptive or maladaptive (e.g., PTSD-like) fear memories.
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1. From dissociation to interaction of emotion and cognition
From the antiquity until the last 50 years, it was commonly held that emotion, and more gen-
erally, all somatic (body-related)/physiological processes disrupted cognition, seen as “pure 
representation” and more recently as “information processing” whose investigation was 
supposed to avoid all “interfering” body-related processes [1, 2]. This view was particularly 
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emphasized by the cognitive revolution, which was inspired by the computer metaphor and 
thus considered that analyses of cognition had to be expurgated of all emotional/physiologi-
cal, potentially disruptive, processes. As Damasio wrote 20 years ago, we all grew up with 
the wide common view “that emotions and reason did not mix any more than oil and water 
(…) that the mechanisms of reason existed in a separate province of the mind, where emotion 
should not be allowed to intrude,” and when thinking about the brain behind that mind, we 
“envisioned separate neural systems for reason and emotion” [3].
In the field of memory research, the essential dissociation between sensory/emotional memory 
and representation-based memory can for instance be found in Aristote (De memoria et reminis-
centia, see in Ref. [4]) in the form of “simple memory” that would be directly related to sensory 
perception and shared by all species, vs. “voluntary memory retrieval” that would be unique to 
humans. In the XIXth century, Maine de Biran was the first philosopher who explicitly referred 
to different forms of memory as a function of the information processing involved. An automatic 
“mechanical memory” involved in the acquisition of habits and a “sensory memory” would 
both operate at an unconscious level and differ from a “representative memory” allowing the 
“conscious recollection of ideas and events” [5]. Finally, it is Henri Bergson who offered the 
most detailed discussion regarding this dissociation between a behavioral/procedural/implicit 
memory vs. a representative/explicit memory in his monography entitled “Matter and memory” 
[6]. According to Bergson, “The past survives under two distinct forms: first, in motor mecha-
nisms; second, in independent recollections.” Regarding the first, “Habit rather than memory, 
it acts our past experience but does not call up its image.” “The other is the true memory, (…) 
leaving to each fact its place and consequently marking its date, truly moving in the past and not, 
like the first, in an ever renewed present.” Strikingly, this description directly echos a distinction 
between nondeclarative and declarative memory systems referring to knowing how and know-
ing what, respectively, and proposed almost a century later by Cohen and Squire [7].
In support of this dissociation are the observations of patients with specific brain lesions who 
display a deficit for one type of memory leaving intact the other one. For instance, a clear 
double dissociation was found between fear conditioning and declarative memories, which 
were shown to be respectively dependent on the amygdala and the hippocampus [8]. Patients 
with bilateral lesion to the amygdala, an almond-shape brain structure adjacent to the hip-
pocampus in the medial temporal lobe, could not acquire a conditioned fear response (mea-
sured as a change in skin conductance) to a conditional stimulus (CS+) previously paired with 
an aversive event (an unconditional stimulus, US), whereas they could acquire the explicit 
knowledge about the contingency between the CS+ and the aversive US. Thus, although these 
patients knew and could declare what they previously learned, they could not display any 
physiological expression of conditioned fear. In contrast, patients with selective bilateral 
lesion of the hippocampus showed an opposite pattern of results, that is, a normal condi-
tioned fear response to the CS+ but no explicit knowledge of the past CS+/US association. This 
study first supports previous data obtained in nonhuman animals indicating a critical role for 
the amygdala in emotional learning [9–13]; second, it indicates that the hippocampus may 
underlie a factual representation of emotionally laden memory; and third, it points out the 
existence of two different neural substrates underlying representative and emotional/sensory 
memories that may not overlap.
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This fundamental dichotomy between emotion and cognition, and more specifically between 
behavioral/emotional memory and explicit/representative memory, has been recurrent 
for several centuries both in philosophical and neuropsychological studies more recently. 
However, the last few decades have highlighted clinical and experimental data indicating that 
emotion and cognition, as well as their underlying neural networks, are in close interaction. 
Overall, these findings even suggest that the understanding of natural cognition requires the 
consideration of emotion.
First, on the basis of several consistent observations of brain-lesioned patients who combined 
normal intellect but profound deficit in decision making together with compromised ability 
to express emotion and to experience feelings, Damasio [3] developed an elegant theory sup-
porting the idea that “reason may not be as pure as most of us think it is or wish it were, that 
emotions and feelings may not be intruders in the bastion of reason at all (…),” but on the 
contrary “indispensable for rationality.” The somatic marker hypothesis he developed [3, 14] 
is an alternative to the pure reasoning, which cannot explain by itself the normal decision 
making that generally takes a few minutes or seconds. In brief, this hypothesis suggests that 
when confronted with a situation that requires an effective choice, biological markers, which 
relate to emotion-related physiological body-states or representation of them, automatically 
qualify or connote, positively or negatively, some particular options or images (as a func-
tion of previous experiences of such a situation). This emotional connotation leads thereby 
individuals to immediately reject some negative outcome-related options and thus to choose 
a particular action among the remaining more positive alternatives. In this view, emotions, 
and more generally body-related physiological mechanisms, directly contribute to normal 
cognition, which guides adaptive behaviors.
Second, in the specific field of memory research, a growing body of evidence consistently 
shows that emotion contributes to the enhancement of episodic/representative/declarative 
memory. Thus, patients with amygdala damage do not show the normal enhancement of 
episodic memory for emotionally laden events when compared to memory for neutral events 
[15–17]. It is classically assumed that such memory enhancement may be due to amygdala’s 
influence on the encoding and/or consolidation of hippocampal-dependent memories [13, 
18–22]. In accordance with the last assumption, manipulation of the amygdala after encoding 
alters memory enhancement classically observed with physiological arousal [23].
Although most of studies examining hippocampal-amygdalar interactions focused on the 
amygdalar influence on episodic memory, several observations indicate that hippocampal-
dependent representative memory can also reciprocally influence amygdala-dependent emo-
tional memory. For instance, in the paradigm called “instructed fear,” the actual CS+/aversive 
US conditioned association is replaced by an explicit oral communication about the CS-US 
contingency. This learning thus requires the hippocampus for acquisition of an episodic rep-
resentation of the emotional significance of the fearful stimulus. Interestingly, it has been 
shown that such paradigm results in robust physiological fear responses to the CS+ that are 
correlated to the activation of the left amygdala [24] and specifically dependent on this brain 
structure [25]. These results indicate that a hippocampus-dependent instructed representation 
of the emotional significance of a stimulus can lead to the amygdala-dependent expression of 
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conditioned fear in situations in which fear is anticipated but the aversive event never actually 
experienced [26]. Another example of this hippocampal influence comes from studies devoted 
to emotion regulation. These studies emphasize the impact of cognition on emotion by show-
ing that reasoning and conscious strategies of reappraisal of emotional scenes can diminish 
both experience of fear and related amygdalar activation [27, 28].
Altogether, these cognitive neuroscience studies first indicate that contrary to what has been 
claimed for centuries, emotion can serve cognition, as exemplified by its critical contribution 
to decision making or to the enhancement and persistence of episodic memory. Second, they 
also reveal that, reciprocally, cognitive processes as reasoning, conscious appraisal, or explicit 
representation of events can modulate emotional responses, either promoting or reducing 
fear. Third, they emphasize the idea that reciprocal amygdalar-hippocampal influences might 
underlie such mutual regulation of emotion and cognition. While supporting this view, the 
present chapter discusses experimental data, obtained in rodents, indicating that the hippo-
campal and amygdalar systems not only regulate each other and their functional outcomes 
but also qualify specific emotional memory representations through specific activations and 
interactions. Hence, beyond the mutual quantitative regulation of these two brain systems 
described so far, we propose that different activations of the hippocampus and amygdala 
leading to specific neural configurations qualitatively impact the formation of emotional 
memory, thereby producing either adaptive or maladaptive fear memories.
2. Adaptive versus maladaptive fear memories
Classical fear conditioning is one of the most used paradigms to study emotional memory. 
Depending on the CS-US contingency, the predictive CS can be either the discrete (i.e., phasic) 
salient CS or the surrounding background context (i.e., tonic contextual cues). If the discrete 
CS is systematically paired with the aversive US, it becomes the right predictor of the US and 
overshadows tonic contextual cues which are thus consigned in the background. In contrast, 
if the discrete/salient CS is presented but explicitly unpaired with the US (pseudo-random 
distribution of the discrete CS and US), then, although salient, it is not predictive of the foot-
shock. Consequently, contextual cues that are continuously present during the aversive expe-
rience become the primary stimuli that enter into association with the footshock and thus 
constitute the right predictor of the US [12, 29–32].
The two fear conditioning procedures described above allows the assessment of adaptive vs. 
maladaptive conditioned fear responses. Typically, animals submitted to the CS-US pairing 
procedure (predicting-discrete CS situation) will normally express more conditioned freezing 
when re-exposed to the discrete CS (e.g., tone) than animals submitted to the CS-US unpairing 
procedure (predicting-context situation). In contrast, when the same animals are re-exposed 
to the conditioning context, those previously submitted to the predicting-context situation 
express more conditioned freezing than animals submitted to the predicting-discrete CS situ-
ation. These results indicate that with the pairing procedure, animals normally form a prefer-
ential discrete CS-US association, identifying the tone CS as the right predictor of the threat 
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to the expense of the background context. In contrast, under the unpairing procedure, the 
context is identified as the right predictor, and this is attested by the expression of an adaptive 
high fear response to contextual cues but not to the discrete CS.
Compared to these adaptive fear responses, a significant fear response to the discrete salient 
CS instead of the context in a predicting-context situation or an increased fear response to the 
conditioning context to the expense of the discrete CS in a predicting-discrete CS situation 
is the behavioral expression of maladaptive fear memories. In both cases, animals take the 
wrong predictor of the threat.
3. The amygdala directly contributes to the formation of adaptive fear 
memory
In the traditional model describing the amygdala function in emotional learning [12], the lat-
eral (LA) amygdaloid nucleus is required for the acquisition of discrete CS-US associations, 
while the basolateral (BLA) nucleus, which receives projections from the hippocampus [33], is 
thought to mediate context–US association. Using reversible inactivation of either LA or BLA, 
one of our studies first confirmed the critical role of the LA in the formation of discrete CS-US 
association and also revealed that the BLA is specifically required for conditioning to contex-
tual cues but not to a discrete tone CS [34]. These data, together with consistent electrophysi-
ological findings showing that thalamic but not polymodal cortical stimulation induces LTP 
in LA, whereas polymodal cortical but not thalamic stimulation induces LTP in BLA strongly 
suggest that LA activation is a sensory interface underlying simple, unimodal CS/US asso-
ciation, whereas the BLA may serve as an amygdaloid sensory interface for more complex 
information, thus underlying associations between the US and configural/contextual cues. As 
this complexity dimension is observed both for input and output pathways of the amygdala, it 
would constitute a common organizing factor in the functional anatomy of this brain structure 
[35]. Second, our study also revealed that the LA enhances or reduces BLA-mediated condi-
tioning to the context depending on whether the context (CS-US unpairing) or the discrete CS 
(CS-US pairing) best predicts the footshock US. Thus, refining the classical model of amygdala 
function in fear learning, these findings indicate that depending on the CS-US contingency, 
LA-BLA interaction (through a competing or synergistic mode) promotes the selection of the 
best predictor of the aversive US, leading thereby to adaptive fear responses [34].
Now, to what extent hippocampal-dependent representative memory can be dissociated from 
amygdala-based emotional memory? Several studies from our laboratory obtained in mice 
provide evidence for a dissociation between the behavioral expression (freezing behavior) of 
fear conditioning and hippocampal neurophysiological coding (changes in hippocampal–sep-
tal synaptic transmission) involved in this emotional learning [29, 31]. In one of these studies, 
we showed that while lesions of the amygdala dramatically reduced the behavioral expres-
sion of fear conditioning, they did not prevent the hippocampal neurophysiological changes 
associated with different types of fear conditioning previously experienced but alter their 
direction. Thus, despite the absence of conditioned freezing, different changes in hippocam-
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pal–septal excitability were specifically associated with a predicting-context and predicting-
discrete CS learning situation [29]. Our suggestion is that these neurophysiological changes 
contribute to a form of knowledge about the conditioning situation encountered by subject 
the day before that would be dissociated from the behavioral expression of this aversive expe-
rience. Nevertheless, while sparing specific hippocampal neurophysiological changes as a 
function of the type of learning, amygdala lesions also clearly interfered with these synaptic 
changes, as they produced opposite changes with respect to nonlesioned controls. Strikingly, 
this observation strongly suggests that the amygdala-dependent and hippocampal-dependent 
forms of knowledge involved are not independent but interactive. Specifically, the content of 
hippocampal-dependent representations about relations among various sensory exterocep-
tive stimuli [36, 37] might be altered if fear conditioning is prevented by amygdala lesions.
In another series of studies, it was shown that the amygdala can indeed modulate synap-
tic plasticity in the hippocampus [38, 39]. Priming the amygdala just prior to an attempt 
to induce long-term potentiation (LTP) in the hippocampus (e.g., by stimulating the BLA 
1 hour before high-frequency stimulation to the perforant path) modulates the level of 
plasticity in a region-specific manner [40–42], much like the effects of exposure to stress 
[38, 43]. It was later found that this modulation was specifically mediated by the basal 
amygdala [44]. Furthermore, stress and amygdala modulation of hippocampal plasticity 
were shown to be dependent on the exact way the amygdala was activated [45, 46], indicat-
ing that such modulation involves a dynamic interaction between these two structures, as 
predicted before [47].
Hence, from an initial emphasis on the dissociation between representative memory and 
emotional/behavioral memory, several findings come to indicate that the underlying neural 
systems of these two types of memory are interactive. It turns out that the hippocampal sys-
tem is modulated by the amygdala, and that such modulation is even dependent on the type 
of learning situation [29]. This last observation led us to propose that the amygdalar influence 
of the hippocampal system might contribute to the selection of relevant emotional informa-
tion and thus to the formation of adaptive fear memory.
4. The septo-hippocampal system is critically required for adaptive fear 
memory
Beyond the classical “restricted” role of the hippocampus in fear memory: a direct contribu-
tion to the selection of predictor of threat.
Lesion and electrophysiological studies indicate that the hippocampus is involved in rela-
tional memory. This theory postulates that the hippocampus is engaged in the encoding of 
events, episodes as sequences of events, and importantly, in linking these episodes by com-
mon features into relational representations in declarative memory. These hippocampus-
dependent relational representations are required for the subject to compare different events 
and contribute to memory flexibility [48–50].
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On these bases, studies dedicated to identify the role of the hippocampus in fear memory, and 
more specifically in fear conditioning, overall indicate a requirement of this brain structure 
in contextual fear conditioning [51, 52]. Indeed, lesion of the hippocampus was shown to 
disrupt conditioned fear responses to the context in which fear conditioning occurs. The cur-
rent neurobiological model of fear conditioning postulates that the hippocampus is required 
for forming an integrated representation of contextual cues. Then, this representation is sub-
sequently associated with the US within the amygdala. Experiments from our laboratory 
contributed to confirm the current view of the role of the hippocampus in contextual condi-
tioning. Nevertheless, they also unveiled a more extended role for the hippocampus in fear 
conditioning. Indeed, our data repeatedly and consistently showed that the hippocampus 
is differentially engaged in fear conditioning depending on the predictive value of CSs and 
contributes to the selection of the right predictor of threat [29, 30, 34, 53–55]. As written above, 
subjects adaptively select among environmental stimuli those that best predict an aversive 
event, either a discrete CS when it is paired with, and thus predictive of the aversive US or the 
context when a CS-US unpairing procedure is used.
Comparing these two conditioning procedures (CS-US pairing vs. unpairing), one of our 
studies revealed that a long-lasting strengthening of CA1 synaptic efficacy is specifically 
observed when the context, but not the discrete CS, is the right predictor of the US [56]. At 
the molecular level, a biphasic pattern of ERK1/2 CREB activation in the CA1 is specifically 
associated with a predicting-context situation, whereas only early monophasic activation is 
observed in a predicting-discrete CS situation [56]. Moreover, blockade of ERK1/2 activation 
with intra-hippocampal infusion of MEK inhibitor severely disrupted conditioned fear to the 
context, when the context, but not the discrete CS, was the right predictor of the US [56]. 
Altogether, these findings show that the hippocampus is differentially engaged in fear con-
ditioning depending on the relative predictive value of the discrete CS vs. context for the 
occurrence of an aversive event. Specifically, they also indicate that hippocampal activation 
is critically required for contextual conditioning when the context, but not the discrete CS, is 
the right predictor of a threat.
In another set of experiments, we found that changes in the hippocampal-septal glutama-
tergic neurotransmission directly contribute to the identification of either the discrete CS 
or the context as predictor of the footshock US. First, a decrease in the hippocampal-lateral 
septal (HPC-LS) synaptic transmission was found to be associated with a predicting-context 
situation, whereas no change or even an increase in this neurotransmission was observed in 
predicting-discrete CS situations [29, 31, 57]. On the basis of these data, we have assessed the 
behavioral consequences of pharmacological manipulation of this glutamatergic neurotrans-
mission. In accordance with previous electrophysiological data, we showed that pretraining 
infusion of glutamic acid into the lateral septum, which mimics an increase in the HPC-LS 
neurotransmission, promotes the selection of a discrete tone CS to the detriment of the context 
as predictor of a footshock US. In contrast, infusion of glutamatergic antagonist (Kynurenate), 
which inhibits this neurotransmission, promotes the selection of the context as major predic-
tor of the US, while blocking the identification of the discrete tone CS as predictor [55]. In full 
accordance with these data, we have previously shown that pretraining infusion of arginine 
vasopressine (AVP) or its antagonist into the lateral septum, which is known to increase and 
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decrease the HPC-LS glutamatergic neurotransmission, respectively, could also promote the 
selection of the discrete tone CS or the context, respectively, as predictor of the US [30].
Altogether, these findings indicate that the role of the hippocampal system is not restricted to 
the processing of contextual information in fear conditioning. Beyond this classic role, consistent 
data unveil a direct contribution of the hippocampal-septal system to the acquisition of adaptive 
fear responses as a function of the learning situation. Our suggestion is that this system plays a 
key role in the selection of relevant stimuli, which are the right predictors of threat (i.e., discrete 
CS vs. contextual cues), thereby contributing to the adaptive value of emotional memory.
How can changes in the HPC-LS glutamatergic neurotransmission favor the selection of 
either a discrete tone CS or contextual cues as predictor of a threat? Previous experiments 
have emphasized the functional importance of changes in HPC-LS excitability for feedback 
regulation of hippocampal activity [58]. Based on these findings, we postulate that glutama-
tergic receptors localized into the LS would exert, via an increase in GABAergic cells excit-
ability, an inhibitory effect on cholinergic cells in the medial septum [59, 60], which projects 
to the hippocampus. This means that in a predicting-discrete CS situation (CS-US pairing), 
the observed increase in HPC-LS glutamatergic neurotransmission would result in a GABA-
mediated decrease in the activity of cholinergic neurons in the medial septum. This negative 
feedback would thus down regulate the hippocampal cholinergic activity, reducing thereby 
the hippocampal-dependent processing of contextual cues to the benefit of the discrete CS. 
By an opposite mechanism, in a predicting-context situation (CS-US unpairing), the observed 
decrease in the HPC-LS glutamatergic neurotransmission would result in a stronger hippo-
campal cholinergic activity, thereby enhancing the hippocampal-dependent processing of 
contextual cues, which would finally be selected as predictor of the footshock US to the detri-
ment of the discrete CS [30].
The hippocampal processing is thought to be powerfully modulated by cholinergic projec-
tions originating in the medial septum/vertical limb nucleus of the diagonal band of Broca 
(MS/VDB). The hippocampal cholinergic neurotransmission has been previously involved 
in various CSs processing [61–66] and is thought to play a critical role in the coordination 
between different memory systems leading to the selection of appropriate behavioral strat-
egies [67–69]. Specifically, increasing cholinergic activity in the hippocampus increases the 
selection of a place strategy to the detriment of cue-based strategy [70, 71]. We thus rea-
soned that changes in this cholinergic neurotransmission might also contribute to the adap-
tive selection of amygdala-mediated CS-US or context-US associations as a function of the 
type of procedure used. First, we showed that the magnitude of the hippocampal choliner-
gic release is dependent on the conditioning procedure used. In a predicting-context situa-
tion, that is, when the context is the right predictor of the US, Acetylcholine (Ach) release is 
stronger than in a predicting-discrete tone CS situation. Second, increasing the hippocam-
pal cholinergic transmission with pretraining intra-hippocampal infusion of physostig-
mine (acetylcholinesterase inhibitor) results in the selection of the context as best predictor 
of US occurrence at the expense of the discrete tone CS. Conversely, decreasing the hippo-
campal cholinergic transmission with intra-hippocampal infusion of muscarinic antagonist 
scopolamine results in the selection of the tone CS instead of the context as main predictor 
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of the US, thus mimicking tone fear conditioning to the detriment of contextual condition-
ing. These results demonstrate that level of hippocampal cholinergic transmission deter-
mines the selection among the context and the discrete CS that one that best predicts the 
aversive US [53]. Interestingly, the pharmacologically induced increase (physostigmine) 
and decrease (scopolamine) in hippocampal cholinergic neurotransmission is respectively 
associated, at the molecular level, with increase and decrease in ERK1/2 activation in both 
CA1 and Dentate Gyrus. Although previous studies have suggested that decreasing hip-
pocampal cholinergic neurotransmission may prevent animals from forming an integrated 
representation of the context Gale [62], our findings reveal a more extended role for this 
neurotransmission in fear conditioning. It turns out that hippocampal cholinergic neuro-
transmission regulates the hippocampal recruitment in fear conditioning as a function of 
the procedure used (CS-US pairing vs. unpairing), thereby contributing to the selection of 
relevant emotional information (predicting- discrete CS or context) and thus to the expres-
sion of adaptive fear responses [53].
Overall, our findings have led us to propose an additional function of the septo-hippocampal 
system in fear conditioning. Beyond to the classical role of this system [49], in the process-
ing of CSs as configural representation, we assume that the hippocampal engagement would 
result in a relational representation of the learning situation including the relative predictive 
value of all CSs (discrete CS and tonic context). When the context is the main predictor of the 
occurrence of an aversive event, the recruitment of the septo-hippocampal system would be 
stronger when a discrete cue best predicts the occurrence of the aversive US. Importantly, this 
differential engagement of the hippocampal system may causally contribute to the attribu-
tion process of different predictive values to the various emotionally laden CSs (i.e., phasic/
discrete CS vs. tonic context).
5. A hippocampal-amygdalar dialogue qualifies emotional memory 
representation
The current neurobiological model of fear conditioning postulates that the only way the 
hippocampus can influence the amygdalar function is by conveying the representation of 
the context where conditioning has occurred to the amygdala. Then, this hippocampus-
dependent representation of the context is supposed to be associated with the US in the 
amygdala. According to this model, the hippocampus has almost no critical role in con-
ditioning to a discrete tone CS, while the amygdala is critically required for forming the 
discrete CS-US association.
According to our proposition, the hippocampus is engaged in the processing of a relational 
representation of CSs and directly contributes to the formation of adaptive fear memories. 
It would thus be involved in both auditory and contextual fear conditioning. Its differential 
engagement as a function of the conditioning procedure would causally contribute to the selec-
tion of one or another CS as predictor of the threat. As it was previously shown that the amyg-
dala also directly contributes to adaptive fear memory, our findings suggest a more  complex 
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relationship between the hippocampus and the amygdala in fear conditioning. In order to 
specify the hippocampal-amygdalar relationship, we reasoned that because changes in the hip-
pocampal cholinergic neurotransmission could determine the selection of either the discrete CS 
or the context as predictor of an aversive US, these changes should also qualitatively constrain 
the amygdalar activation. As described above, decreasing the hippocampal cholinergic trans-
mission by intra-hippocampal infusions of scopolamine prior to fear conditioning promotes 
the selection of the discrete tone CS as predictor of the US at the expense of the context. As 
expected, our study further showed that this hippocampal manipulation not only mimics tone 
fear conditioning but also produces a pattern of phosphorylated-ERK (p-ERK1/2) expression 
within the lateral (LA) and basolateral (BLA) amygdala similar to the one observed in control 
mice for which the discrete tone CS is objectively the right predictor. Conversely, increasing 
the hippocampal cholinergic transmission with intra-hippocampal infusion of physostigmine 
results in the selection of the context as predictor of US. In that case, and in a very consistent 
manner, physostigmine infusion produces a pattern of p-ERK1/2 expression in the LA/BLA 
similar to that one observed in mice for which the context objectively best predicts the US 
[53]. These findings reveal that the hippocampal cholinergic neurotransmission constrains the 
amygdala function: depending on its level, it produces two different patterns of amygdalar 
activation, which specifically underlie either context or discrete CS-US association, thereby 
leading to predominant conditioned fear responses either to the context or to the discrete CS. 
Hence, depending on the objective predictive value of the CSs for the occurrence of an aver-
sive event, changes in the hippocampal cholinergic neurotransmission determine the relative 
engagement of the LA and BLA nuclei in bringing about the adaptive selection of either the 
discrete CS or the context as valid predictor. These findings are in accordance with the view 
supporting a role for Ach in regulating the relative contribution of different neural systems for 
learning [67, 68, 72]. These findings are also congruent with previous clinical studies indicating 
that having a hippocampal dependent episodic representation of the predictive value of CSs 
influences amygdala-based memory [24, 27, 28].
Altogether, these findings have led us to propose a modified version of the neurobiologi-
cal model of fear conditioning. When the discrete tone CS is the main predictor of US, an 
increased HPC-LS glutamatergic neurotransmission would result in a GABA-mediated 
decrease in the activity of cholinergic neurons located in the medial septum, which projects to 
the hippocampus. Under this predicting-discrete CS situation, the low hippocampal choliner-
gic activity constrains the LA/BLA functioning in such a way (competition) that the discrete 
CS, and not the context, is ultimately selected as valid predictor. Conversely, when the context 
is the best predictor, a decrease in the glutamatergic hippocampal-septal neurotransmission 
would result in an increased release of acetylcholine in the hippocampus. This high level 
of Ach release contributes to a synergistic functioning of LA and BLA nuclei necessary for 
the selection of the context as the main predictor of the threat [34, 53]. Finally, different but 
specific engagements of the septo-hippocampal-amygdalar network appear to underlie the 
selection of relevant information, thereby contributing to the formation of adaptive emotional 
memories. The hippocampal and amygdalar systems not only regulate each other and their 
functional outcomes but also qualify specific emotional memory representations through spe-
cific activations and interactions [73].
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6. Dysfunction in the hippocampal-amygdalar dialogue might contribute 
to PTSD-related memory
Experimental studies just described above indicate that direct [53] or indirect manipulation 
[30, 55] of the hippocampal cholinergic neurotransmission can result in maladaptive fear 
memories. The identification of the discrete CS instead of the context in a predicting-context 
situation, or conversely, the selection of the context instead of the discrete CS in a predicting-
tone CS situation reflects the formation of false memory that leads to the expression of inap-
propriate fear responses to the wrong predictor of a threat.
Specifically, these studies consistently show that all manipulations that aim at blocking or 
decreasing the hippocampal cholinergic transmission lead to the selection of an irrelevant but 
salient discrete CS instead of the background contextual cues as predictor of the footshock 
US. This striking formation of a prevalent discrete CS-US association to the detriment of the 
context-US association in a situation in which the discrete CS does not yet predict the occur-
rence of the threat is reminiscent of some critical aspects of traumatic memory as observed 
in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Indeed, one of the cardinal features of PTSD-related 
memory is a paradoxical qualitative alteration of memory including both memory intensifica-
tion for the core traumatic event and a memory deficit for the traumatic environment. In other 
words, hypermnesia for some salient trauma-related cues that received the full attention of the 
subject during the traumatic event would co-exist with amnesia for peri-traumatic contextual 
stimuli that were too briefly apprehended to receive enough conscious attention [74–78]. Of 
particular relevance with the PTSD-related memory profile are the studies indicating that 
an increase in emotional arousal can promote the use of cue-based memory, but that such 
bias could result from an impairing effect of emotion on hippocampus-dependent cognitive 
memory [79].
Most of animal models of PTSD-related memory have exclusively focused on the quantitative 
alteration of memory, that is, the persistence of a strong fear memory, neglecting the qualita-
tive alteration of traumatic memory. Yet, for over a century, clinical studies have consistently 
described the underrepresentation of the trauma in the context-based hippocampal-depen-
dent memory system in favor of its overrepresentation in a cue-based sensory/emotional/
implicit amygdala-dependent memory system [74, 76, 77]. In full accordance with the data 
presented above, these studies strongly suggest that a hippocampal-dependent deficit in 
contextual processing of stressful situations might contribute to the development of PTSD-
related paradoxical memory.
In order to explain this hypermnesia/amnesia paradoxical profile, Layton and Krikorian [77] 
proposed an interesting neurobiological model in which PTSD-related memory would be the 
result of an increasing amygdalar inhibition of the hippocampus along with situations of increas-
ing stress intensity. In low-to-mild stressful situations, the amygdala, weakly activated, would 
stimulate the hippocampus, promoting thereby the consolidation of hippocampal-dependent 
declarative information that would culminate in the formation of long-term “flashbulb” mem-
ory. As discussed above, this hypothesis is supported by considerable data indicating that the 
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amygdala modulates hippocampal activity and positively contributes to the consolidation of 
autobiographical information that are emotionally connoted [26, 29, 80]. In contrast, in intense 
or extreme stressful situations, the amygdala would be more and more recruited and would 
increasingly inhibit the hippocampus. As a consequence, trauma-related stimuli could not be 
consolidated anymore in the declarative memory system and thus would be susceptible to 
amnesia. Nevertheless, because the amygdala would directly contribute to the consolidation of 
the trauma, this one could be retrieved. The memory of the trauma, however, would be mostly 
implicit and would only correspond to what the amygdala can encode and store, that is the 
core of the trauma as well as certain details like the most salient simple cues and associated 
emotional feelings. This hypothesis is extremely congruent with the idea developed here that 
hippocampal disruption and dysfunction in hippocampal-amygdalar interaction can produce a 
switch from normal to abnormal fear memory-like PTSD-related paradoxical memory.
In line with this idea, we recently demonstrated a key role for the hippocampus in PTSD-like 
fear memory in mice under high-stressful situation. Because corticosterone (CORT), the main 
stress hormone in rodents, was shown to enhance the consolidation of adaptive fear memory 
in some stressful situations [26, 81–84], but also to impair the hippocampal function and dis-
rupt context-based memory in others [85–87], we hypothesized that injection of CORT into the 
hippocampus, its main brain target, immediately after fear conditioning might either promote 
adaptive or produce PTSD-like fear memory as a function of the intensity of the stressful event. 
In order to observe a putative experimental bias toward a cue-based memory at the expense of 
a hippocampal-dependent context-based memory of the trauma, we used a predicting-context 
condition in which a discrete (tone) CS is present but irrelevant (not predictive of the US). In 
that case, the erroneous selection of the discrete CS as predictor of the footshock US reflects the 
expression of a maladaptive (PTSD-like) fear memory. As expected, we first showed that in a 
predicting-context situation using low footshock intensity, CORT injection in the hippocampus 
enhances adaptive conditioned fear to the context. In contrast, after a high-stress condition, the 
same CORT injection produces PTSD-like memory with the induction of a fear response to the 
most salient but irrelevant cue (a discrete tone) together with a decreased fear response to the 
right predictor (the conditioning context). Second, as in humans [88–91], compared to normal 
fear memory, PTSD-like memory induced in mice was found to be associated with hyperactiva-
tion of the right amygdala together with hypoactivation of the hippocampus [92].
Altogether these studies unveil a key role for the hippocampal-amygdalar network in the 
appraisal of emotional information and the formation of adaptive fear memories. As attested 
by behavioral and brain imaging outcomes of experimental manipulations of this network, 
dysfunction in this neural circuit, especially mediated by disruption of the hippocampal acti-
vation, turns out to be at the core of the development of abnormal/maladaptive fear memory, 
as observed in stress-related disorders like PTSD.
7. Conclusion: co-determined emotion and cognition
Although emotion can impair cognitive processes in certain extreme circumstances leading 
to maladaptive fear memory like in PTSD, it can also serve cognition. A growing body of 
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evidence indicates that in contrast to artificial cognition, our natural cognition implies emo-
tional experience with all its underlying somatic/physiological mechanisms. The fact that 
emotion can serve cognition, as illustrated by its critical contribution to decision making and 
to the enhancement of episodic memory, has been associated for a few decades to this other 
fact that, reciprocally, cognitive processes regulate emotional states. In addition, numerous 
data now indicate that this mutual regulation is mediated, at least in part, by a reciprocal 
modulation of the amygdalar and hippocampal systems.
Beyond the mutual quantitative regulation of these two brain systems described so far, the 
present chapter developed the idea that different recruitments of the hippocampus and the 
amygdala lead to specific neural configurations that qualitatively impact the formation of 
emotional memory, thereby producing different memory representations of an aversive expe-
rience. First, showing that the amygdala differentially modulates the hippocampal-septal 
excitability depending on whether a discrete CS or a complex background context is identi-
fied as predictor of a threat (i) indicates that a brain structure traditionally involved in the 
attribution of an affective value to neutral stimuli interact with another brain system that 
is supposed to underlie the “cognitive” processing of factual information and (ii) suggests 
that the hippocampal-dependent appraisal of such information may thus be dependent on 
the amygdala-dependent emotional experience encountered. Second, showing reciprocally 
that manipulating the hippocampal system during the acquisition of an aversive experience 
dramatically alters, and in fact can even lead to the switch from adaptive to maladaptive 
conditioned fear responses, indicates that a brain system known to underlie factual/represen-
tative memory directly contributes to the formation of specific emotional memory representa-
tions. Third, the systematic comparison of two different fear-conditioning situations, that is, 
predicting-context vs. predicting-discrete CS situation, revealed that the hippocampal system 
and amygdala both contribute to each learning situation. Importantly, their contribution to 
these two different learnings implies different patterns of activation and thus different recruit-
ments of the hippocampal-amygdalar network as a function of the predictor of the threat. 
Hence, the main implication of this observation is that two neural systems known to underlie 
two well-known dissociable forms of memory turn out to be closely interactive when normal 
individuals form adaptive emotional memory.
While this chapter started with the idea of a fundamental dissociation between behavioral/
emotional memory vs. representative memory, it comes to the idea that, except in some extent 
in pathological states, any of these two forms of memory can be conceived as isolated from 
the other. As proposed by Varela et al. 20 years ago [2], while all formal representations or 
cognitive processes are fundamentally embodied and “emerge from recurrent sensory-motor 
patterns,” reciprocally all behavioral expressions of a past experience are necessarily con-
straint and guided by the cognitive structure of the individual concerned. In other words, 
our cognition would be “a creative form of enacting significance on the basis of the animal’s 
embodied history.”
In line with both the somatic markers hypothesis proposed by Damasio [3, 14] and the con-
cept of “enaction” proposed by Varela et al. [2], the studies reviewed here support the gen-
eral idea that “cognitive representation” and “emotional experience” should be conceived 
as co-determined entities, while factual representation takes its roots in somato-visceral 
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experiences, reciprocally, emotional experience depends on a more or less sophisticated 
guiding factual representation, such mutual dependency serves the expression of adaptive 
behaviors.
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